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Abstract
One of the most pressing issues when making decisions over long-term environmental problems is deciding on 
an appropriate discount rate. This can be a highly technical discussion. While some argue in favour of market 
rates, which usually tend to be high, others support the use of near-zero rates to ensure that both current and 
future generations are properly accounted for. This paper presents an alternative approach to determining the 
discount rate for environmental assets in the case of land-use planning - the Equivalency Principle (EP) - based on 
the normative proposition that the social value of protected natural land should be at least the same as the market 
price of an adjacent land with similar environmental characteristics that has been granted permission for 
development. The paper first provides a theoretical overview of the approach, followed by an application of the 
EP at the land plot level across 11 European countries. Based on the EP, pure rates of social time preference that 
would equate natural and development land values within each administrative unit have been calculated. The 
findings show that the application of the EP usually results in discount rates that are lower-than-market rates and 
that are geographically differentiated. This implies discount rates that account for preferences of the society 
where the land or natural resource is located, with results ranging between 0% and 11%, with an average rate of 
1% across study sites.





2 Decisions with consequences that occur over the long-term are widely known in economics as inter-temporal 
3 choices. Indeed, inter-temporal decision-making has been studied during the last 80 years through the 
4 Discounted Utility (DU) model, formulated by Paul Samuelson (1937). The DU model assumes that society 
5 prefers to receive benefits in the short-term while delaying costs to the future, by “exponentially discounting 
6 the value of outcomes” as they occur further in time, thus placing decreasing weight on the value of future 
7 welfare. However, if lower discount rates give higher value to future generations more likely to suffer from 
8 environmental impacts, but come at a cost of greater economic sacrifices to the current generation, then what 
9 is the most appropriate discount rate to use? 
10 The classical framework for representing inter-temporal choices has been widely disputed over the years for the 
11 use of market rates. Bromley (1998) says that traditional sustainability approaches based on commoditising 
12 natural assets, and making judgements of welfare and utility across generations (and across infinitely many time 
13 periods) cannot stand because the desires, valuations and preferences of future generations are totally unknown 
14 and unknowable to us. Based on this, Bromley asserts that we should follow rights-based approaches to 
15 sustainability wherein those living now agree to preserve ‘settings and circumstances’ for the future. Gowdy 
16 (2004) on the other hand, argues that based on the considerable evidence showing that people value the 
17 medium and distant futures the same (hyperbolic discounting), straight-line discounting (whereby the future is 
18 discounted at the same rate during all future time periods) may seriously underestimate the benefits of long-
19 term environmental policies. After a comprehensive discussion on environmental discounting in his book 
20 Greenhouse Economics: Value and Ethics, Spash (2002) boils the debate down to one between ethics and 
21 economics. While acknowledging this, he ascertains that: ‘The contradiction is that economics takes a very 
22 specific philosophical and ethical position and then tries to deny the relevance of ethics in economics. The conflict 
23 of values remains despite the attempts to remove their explicit discussion from the economic debate” (Spash, 
24 2002, p. 188). A significant milestone came in 2007 with the Stern Review on the economics of climate change, 
25 which advocated for the use of near-zero discount rates for representing intergenerational preferences on 
26 climate change (Stern, 2007). Its publication received mixed reviews. Several leading economists, such as 
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27 Dasgupta (2007) and Weitzman (2009), agree wholly with the use of low discount rates given the inadequacy of 
28 traditional neoclassical frameworks for addressing environmental issues characterised by irreversibility, 
29 uncertainty and long-term horizons. Others, while agreeing on the need for action on climate change, considered 
30 the Review incomplete and its conclusions ambiguous from an economic perspective (Tol, 2006; Tol and Yohe, 
31 2006). Indeed, in his appraisal, Nordhaus (2007) argues that the Review confuses two fundamental concepts of 
32 discounting. The first, defined as the “real interest rate”, relates to the annual percentage increase in the 
33 purchasing power of a financial asset, measured by the nominal or market interest rate on that asset minus the 
34 inflation rate (Frank et al., 2007). The second, called the “pure rate of social time preference”, is concerned with 
35 the economic welfare of households or generations over time. It describes the rate at which society is willing to 
36 postpone a unit of current consumption or expenditure in exchange for future consumption. The pure rate of 
37 social time preference has been proposed as a social discount rate for public projects in general, given the 
38 consideration of intergenerational equity for long-term projects (Scarborough, 2011). Therefore, unlike the real 
39 interest rate, which deals with future goods or investments, the pure rate of social time preference involves the 
40 discounting of future welfare. In this case, a discount rate of zero would ensure that present and future 
41 generations are treated equally, whilst a positive rate would imply a reduction in the value placed on the welfare 
42 of future generations compared to the present generation.  
43 When discussing the use of near-zero rates proposed by Stern, or Nordhaus’s support of real (market) interest 
44 rates close to 6% per year, Beckerman and Hepburn (2007) assert that the choice of either alternative is not 
45 trivial, and may have a decisive influence when assessing the economics of climate policy. Instead, they propose 
46 an intermediate approach based on the use of stated preference surveys, behavioural experiments and methods 
47 for determining discount rates reflective of social preferences. Conversely, Philibert (2006) proposes to assign a 
48 growing value over time to environmental assets that are not substitutable and not reproducible, or 
49 alternatively, he suggests the use of declining discount rates to account for the uncertainty of future economic 
50 growth. Others, such as Cropper and Laibson (1998), Gollier (2008) and Groom (2014) agree with Philibert’s 
51 assertion of declining rates. Chichilnisky (1996) argues that no generation should prevail over the other, and 
52 similarly proposes the use of a conventional, market-based, discounting approach in the near-future and a rate 
53 of zero after an inflexion point. Certainly arguments for the use of declining discount rates are often justified on 
54 the basis of: uncertainties related to market-based rates or behavioural changes in the long-term, or due to the 
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55 aggregation of heterogeneous pure rates of social time preference. It seems that during the last decade a non-
56 official consensus has been reached in favour of social discount rates that decrease in the long-term (Groom, 
57 2014). 
58 Since the early 2000’s the notion of dual-discounting has been emerging as a way to value environmental goods 
59 and services separately and differently from other costs and benefits (Tol, 2003; Yang, 2003). For example, 
60 Gollier (2010) argues in favour of an ecological discount rate smaller than the economic discount rate, where he 
61 estimates that changes in biodiversity be discounted at a rate of 1.5%, while changes in consumption be 
62 discounted at a higher rate of 3.2%.  By separating the environment from other market goods and services, the 
63 approach ensures that future environmental assets are not undervalued or that the [economic] discount rate 
64 applied to them is not too large (Gollier, 2010).  Indeed, as Weikard and Zhu (2005) argue dual rate discounting 
65 can be justified in cases where future prices for environmental goods are unavailable, or when market goods 
66 and environmental goods are not substitutable. This seems reasonable given that many environmental 
67 restoration or enhancement projects carried out by governments would be otherwise unable to meet decision-
68 making criteria based on conventional CBA and discounting practices (Almansa and Martínez-Paz, 2011). But 
69 Green and Richards (2018) argue that the way that humans value monetary goods should not be confounded 
70 with the way they value environmental goods. Indeed, in their paper based on experimental evidence, the 
71 authors find that individual discounting behaviour, while varying widely across environmental goods, generally 
72 tends to be exponential, such that individuals discount environmental goods at lower rates compared to 
73 monetary goods. The evidence-base suggests that humans share a complex relationship with the environment 
74 unlikely captured by traditional economic valuation methods. Supporting this point, Adger et al. (2011) observe 
75 that climate change policy tends to disregard the relationship between aggregate measures of human welfare 
76 and the environment, that is, the “emotional, symbolic, spiritual, and widely perceived intrinsic values of the 
77 environment.” 
78 The main focus of this paper explores the complex relationship between people and the environment. In 
79 particular, it seeks to address the various trade-offs between conservation and development, and the common 
80 undervaluation of natural resources within conventional decision-making frameworks. Building on the literature 
81 on dual-discounting, this study suggests an approach for determining the discount rate for environmental assets 
82 in the case of land-use planning – the so-called Equivalency Principle (EP). This is based on the normative 
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83 proposal explained in Chiabai et al. (2013), which argue that when one of two identical pieces of natural land 
84 located in the same administrative unit has been granted permission for development, market distortions 
85 stemming from regulations and externalities arise that will cause these two lands to be valued differently. This 
86 situation generates an anomaly that potentially may have deep ethical and environmental implications, as it 
87 may generate incentives to urbanise natural land rather than to use or restore existing urban land.  The authors 
88 propose that both pieces of land should be valued equally, as the present value of both is at least equivalent, 
89 and subsequently, future generations are likely to give them equal utility and economic value. An important 
90 benefit of this approach is that it avoids making assumptions about the expected welfare or growth rate of 
91 consumption of future generations, and the magnitude of projected uncertain impacts for example due to 
92 climate change, which might materialise differently in the future.
93 Based on the EP, this paper estimates discount rates for several types of natural assets across Europe, based on 
94 the hypothesis that rates are likely to differ geographically, reflecting the preferences of the society where the 
95 land or natural resource is located. The objective of this study is thus to develop the EP as a practical rule of 
96 thumb that could guide investment decisions in the context of environmental and resource economics, and help 
97 to justify the use of lower-than-market discount rates for valuing environmental assets and ensuring sustainable 
98 land-use planning on both ethical and economic grounds.
99 The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 first discusses the theoretical basis of the EP including its 
100 economic rationale and caveats, followed by an explanation of the methodological approach applied in this 
101 study Section 3 presents the results for over 300 sites across Europe. Section 4 discusses some of the main 
102 findings and section 5 is devoted to conclusions. 
103 2. Method
104 2.1. Foundations of the EP
105 As discussed previously, dual discounting can be used by Governments and donor agencies (e.g. financial 
106 institutions) as an additional policy instrument for environmental protection. In an ideal scenario, this would 
107 imply using market rates for projects that do not affect the environment but lower rates, such as those derived 
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108 from the EP, for projects that do. This is justified on the basis that it is reasonable to expect a higher level of 
109 scarcity of natural resources in the future and investments to preserve such assets today need to take account 
110 of this. Of course, threats to the environment, i.e. encroaching development in natural areas to sustain economic 
111 growth and potentially catastrophic impacts due to future climate change, may deplete environmental resources 
112 to such an extent that damages become irreversible. Moreover, while the exact relationship between the 
113 discount rate and the exploitation of natural resources is unknown, the general consensus is that the higher the 
114 discount rate, “the faster the depletion of exhaustible resources and the more intense the harvesting of 
115 renewable resources in the future” (Markandya and Pearce, 1991, p. 148). The EP offers one way of addressing 
116 this by estimating a range of discount rates that can be used in cost-benefit analysis carried out for investment 
117 projects affecting natural land.
118 Let us now, for illustrative purposes, imagine two plots of natural land located in the same area, N1 and N2, which 
119 have identical environmental and geographical characteristics (slope, ecosystem, proximity to infrastructures, 
120 etc.). Having both the exact same characteristics today, the current value of both plots of land would be the 
121 same. If their characteristics do not change and both plots remain in a natural state in the long-term, then their 
122 utility is expected to be the same. However, if one of the plots is granted permission for development today 
123 then we can expect a significant increase in its market price, while the value of the natural land stays unchanged. 
124 Here, the administrative act of ‘granting development’ causes one of the lands to be valued higher, despite the 
125 inherent characteristics of both plots of land remaining the same. While some may argue that the added value 
126 reflects the expected stream of private benefits stemming from future development, the argument neglects the 
127 almost certain (and irreversible) loss of environmental externalities caused by such (or any type of) 
128 development. Moreover, the shift in land values increases the attractiveness of developing on the land valued 
129 lower, which means policy-makers are economically incentivised to urbanise natural land rather than to use or 
130 restore existing brownfields for development projects. As Loures and Vas (2018) postulate the process is further 
131 complicated by the numerous typologies and characteristics attributed to brownfields, which encompasses land 
132 types such as abandoned land, contaminated land, derelict land, underutilised land and vacant land. Without 
133 clear definition, different land types can likely be regarded as substitutable, without recognising the relative 
134 difference in intrinsic environmental benefits associated with each.
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135 McCarthy (2002) asserts, brownfield reuse is fundamental for wider community goals aimed at achieving 
136 environmental protection, revitalising cities, and reducing suburban sprawl. Such distortions in the market must 
137 be addressed if we are to ensure the sustainable protection of vital environmental assets and services, 
138 particularly given the already impending challenges of climate change for future generations. The solution 
139 offered by Chiabai et al. (2013) suggests that discounting may be used to regain the equivalency in the present 
140 value of both plots of land. This is done by equating the discounted sum of the flow of benefits of the natural 
141 land with the current market price of the development land, regardless of whether it has been designated for 
142 natural, residential or industrial purposes. The objective of this approach is not to derive relative values for the 
143 purpose of valuing natural land, but rather it specifically chooses to focus on the discount rate as a practical tool 
144 for informing land-use decision-making in cases involving the environment. In fact, the main strength of the 
145 approach stems from the idea that policy-makers can easily integrate its concept into cost-benefit appraisals for 
146 investment projects irrespective of time, scale or contextual setting. In fact, policy makers often have serious 
147 difficulties to choose the discount factor or this is given by financial authorities with no environmental or ethical 
148 consideration involved.
149 In practical terms, if plot N1 is zoned as urban (U), either for residential or industrial use, then N1 = U; while N2 
150 remains in its original state (N) (Figure 1). Here, the market price of the development land becomes greater than 
151 that of the natural plot of land (PN1 = PU > PN2). The value of N₂, usually estimated as the present value per hectare 
152 (PVN), is often determined by non-market valuation methods, and should represent the Total Economic Value 
153 (TEV) of the natural land, comprising both use and non-use values. Using the conventional equation for the 
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We can justify extending time to infinity on the basis that human welfare depends on the quality of ecosystem 
services and, because of this, their total value for the economy and for human society may be infinite 
(Costanza et al., 1997). While the above formula assumes that the benefits are constant over time, flows can 
be expected to increase over time in real terms as a result of growing real incomes and increasing scarcity of 
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When time extends to infinity the formula can be simplified to the following expression:
𝑃𝑉𝑁 =
𝑉𝑁
(𝑑 ― 𝑔) = 𝑃𝑈
(2’)





Equation 3 is based on the consideration of increasing flows of benefits over time. If growth is not taken into 
account,  would equate to zero. 𝑔
155
156 Alternative policy instruments for achieving environmental protection can often be classified into two main 
157 approaches: “command and control” and “market-based” methods. While the first approach, command and 
158 control, relies on various (ambient, emission and technology) standards to promote socially desirable behavior  
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159 (Field and Field, 1997), market-based approaches instead aim to incentivize firms (e.g. through taxes and 
160 pollution rights) to make more sustainable choices. Both policy instruments face a number of political economy 
161 issues however. For example: conventional command and control approaches have often been criticized for not 
162 meeting environmental objectives at least-cost, while various political and technological constraints make 
163 market-based approaches ill-suited for dealing with certain environmental problems (Berck, 2018). In cases 
164 where traditional policy instruments are unable to effectively meet environmental objectives, such as the land 
165 planning example described before, the EP offers an alternative approach for enhancing environmental 
166 protection. Contrary to implementing a new environmental tax or passing additional legislation, which are highly 
167 political processes that may take years to carry out, one of the main advantages of the EP is that policy makers 
168 can use it as a basis for determining environmental discount rates immediately and its application is theoretically 
169 valid under only two assumptions:
170
171 1. Past decision making by the administrative uniti of reference on development versus protection of 
172 natural assets has been close to socially optimal, so that the marginal present value of the natural land 
173 is equal to the marginal present value of the adjacent development land (Chiabai et al., 2013), and;
174 2. Future generations may be affected in the long run by decisions made over the land under 
175 consideration 
176 However, while optimal decision-making would imply policy-makers are making perfect marginal trade-offs 
177 between preservation and development, the assumption here is that (while all else is optimal)a land-use 
178 decisions have not been able to properly account for the myriad of environmental externalities associated with 
179 natural lands. This can be the case very often in decisions related to land use planning. Indeed, as Chee (2004, 
180 p. 549) posits: ‘decisions concerning ecosystem management are often complex, socially contentious and 
181 fraught with uncertainty.’ This relates, for example, to difficulties in realizing the full range of implicit regulating, 
182 provisioning, cultural and supporting ecosystem services of the environment; in capturing the true ‘market’ 
183 value of complex environmental functions (e.g. aesthetic and cultural worth) where no market exists, and; in 
184 appropriately determining the welfare that environmental preservation would bring to future generations 
a i.e. in terms of legality, cost-efficiency, feasibility etc.
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185 greater affected by climate change. Failure to internalize environmental externalities within land-use decision-
186 making has meant local governments have fewer policy levers to disincentivise development through mandatory 
187 or voluntary regulations, with zoning remaining the most widely accepted control tool for land-use planning 
188 (Geoghegan, 2002).
189
190 Figure 2 illustrates the concept of near-optimal decision-making using a stylized production possibility frontier 
191 (PPF). The figure is divided into three areas (A, B and C):
192
193  Area A – represents a situation where decision-making has been close to optimal. Therefore, the marginal 
194 benefit of developing an additional unit of nature is approximately the same as the cost. This is the only 
195 area where the EP explicitly applies.
196  Area B - when an area has been over-developed the EP should not be used as protecting the remaining 
197 natural land will far outweigh the benefits of further development. This can be seen when moving from 
198 point B1 to B2, where a small gain in development causes a great loss in environmental benefits.
199  Area C – the reverse scenario is also possible. In regions that are severely under-developed, the cost to 
200 society from the loss of some environmental services will be far outweighed by the benefits that 
201 development will bring. This is illustrated by a shift from point C1 to C2. 
202 The second assumption required to justify the use of the EP is that future generations are affected in the long 
203 run by decisions taken on the land. This assumption is easy to meet as natural land that has been degraded or 
204 converted can rarely be restored to its original state (Moreno-Mateos et al., 2017, 2015). This irreversibility 
205 highlights the importance of using the EP in decision-making in order to preserve the remaining natural land for 
206 future generations by incentivizing the use of brownfields for new construction instead of developing on natural 
207 parcels of land. 
208 [Figure 2 here]
209 2.2. Methodological approach
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210 In order to satisfy the pre-conditions of the EP, two types of data were collected; the first representing the non-
211 market values of natural land, and the second representing the prices of neighbouring lands with similar 
212 environmental characteristics designated for a certain type of development (i.e. commercial, industrial, 
213 residential) within the same administrative unit. Data was collected from sites across Europeii in order to assess 
214 how the application of the EP would change according to different contextual settings and a sensitivity analysis 
215 was conducted to better understand the ranges of discount rates observed. For the purposes of presenting an 
216 illustrative example of how the EP might apply, and to better understand the drivers of differences in values, a 
217 simplified approach was adopted that does not consider the impact of various economic growth rates in the 
218 future. This was intended to eliminate the inherent uncertainty in such values. 
219 2.2.1. Data collection
220 The first stage of the methodology involved collecting data on the values of natural land. This involved 
221 conducting an extensive literature review of both the scientific and grey literature, using widely recognised 
222 search engines such as Google Scholar and Web of Science. A keyword search was performed to detect primary 
223 valuation studies that measured the TEV of natural land. The TEV is defined as “the sum of the values of all 
224 service flows that natural capital generates both now and in the future – appropriately discounted” (Kumar, 
225 2012, p. 188) and encompasses: direct and indirect use values, option values, existence values and bequest 
226 values. Because of difficulties in capturing and accounting for all components of TEV (Anderson et al., 2016), as 
227 well as the conceptual and empirical difficulties involved in adding up various component values of TEV (Randall, 
228 1987), studies that included at least one component of TEV were included. Both direct (stated-preference) and 
229 indirect (revealed preference) approaches were included to limit the potential bias associated with considering 
230 one approach, as well as to demonstrate the flexibility of the EP. Due to the large volume of research conducted 
231 in earlier years, a time-range between 1990 and 2015 was chosen.  All values were converted to EUR 2016 prices 
232 using the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and Consumer Price Index (CPI) conversion factors provided by the 
233 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)iii. 
234 After the initial stage was complete, the next stage involved collecting data on neighbouring lands designated 
235 for development purposes. At the aggregate level, Eurostat is currently the only public database available that 
236 provides land prices at the EU and national level. These values focus predominantly however, on agricultural 
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237 land types, and lack the geographical detail for analysis at the district or provincial scale. Other sources, including 
238 national government agencies and national statistical offices were searched, some of which focused exclusively 
239 on agricultural land types and lacked data on prices for alternative land uses. Most official sources however, 
240 such as the Valuation Office Agency (VOA) in the UK, the Federal Statistical Office in Germany, the Spanish 
241 Ministry of Public Works and Transport in Spain, the Belgian Statistical Office in Belgium, the Central Statistical 
242 Office of Poland and the National Land Survey of Finland, provided relevant data on land markets, including data 
243 on prices for building land, such as residential and commercial land. For the remaining countries, publicly 
244 available regional real-estate market reports were used to gather data on prices of land designated for particular 
245 development purposes. 
246 The literature on natural land values and the data on prices of adjacent development lands were sorted and 
247 categorised within a database. Studies with missing information or that were located in regions with no data on 
248 land prices were excluded from the database. The final database consisted of 47 studies and 308 site values, 
249 across 11 European countries. A summary of the literature on the values of natural land can be seen in Table 1, 
250 and relative data on market prices of development land can be found in Appendix I.
251 [Table 1 here]
252 2.2.2. Data description
253 Considering the availability of data on natural land values and market prices of development lands, the largest 
254 estimated range of discount rates was calculated for the United Kingdom with a total of 90 values, followed by 
255 the Netherlands and Greece, with 64 and 48 values, respectively (Fig. 3). Over 70% of entries employed the use 
256 of stated preference methods, such as the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) to value natural site benefits. 
257 Although such methods have been subject to certain controversies and potential biases (Diamond and Hausman, 
258 1994), the large share of studies adopting this approach is reflective of the fact that stated preference methods 
259 are often the only available tool to value certain sites or to elicit certain types of values. In addition, despite their 
260 limitations, such approaches for ecosystem service valuation can provide important insight for decision-making 
261 where no alternative exists. Indeed as Bingham et al. (1995, p. 87) assert, while improving economic valuation 
262 of ecosystem services may lead to improved decision-making over environmental issues, it will not solve for the 
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263 “collective political decisions about distribution issues, including rights to resource use to future generations or 
264 within the present generation.”     
265 [Figure 3 here]
266 Studies included a range of provisioning, supporting, regulating and cultural ecosystem services (Table 2), which 
267 are defined as the benefits that humans obtain from ecosystems produced by interactions within the ecosystem 
268 (Assessment, 2005). Most common were provisioning services such as fresh water provision and the supply of 
269 raw materials, as well as cultural services such as tourism, or the recreational or aesthetic value of the land. 
270 Other services included flood and erosion control, and carbon sequestration (regulating services), as well as 
271 biodiversity and nature conservation (supporting services). Habitat types also varied across studies, with most 
272 values estimated for forests (137), followed by wetlands (129), coastal areas (41), grasslands (30) and water 
273 bodies (15) (Figure 4). Table 2 presents general descriptions of methods, habitats, land status, and types of 
274 ecosystem services observed in the literature.
275 [Figure 4 here]
276
277
278 [Table 2 here]
279 3. Results 
280 3.1. General results
281 A box plot showing the distribution of discount rates by habitat type is shown in Figure 5, and the median, mean, 
282 maximum and minimum result ranges are presented in Table 3. Average discount rates ranging between 0.3% 
283 and 1.1% were estimated across habitat types. Coastal areas represented the highest discount rates on average 
284 (1.1%), followed by wetlands (0.6%), grasslands (0.3%), forests (0.3%) and water bodies (0.3%). As figure 5 
285 shows, excluding outliersiv, the majority of discount rates across habitats fell below 1.2%, with median values 
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286 ranging between 0% (in the case of water bodies) and 0.2% (in the case of wetlands). The higher discount rates 
287 for coastal areas is attributed to the generally higher social values placed on these habitats, with an average TEV 
288 of approximately €24,028 compared to €11,674, €6,603, €4,621 and €1,749 for wetlands, forests, grasslands, 
289 and water bodies, respectively. Certainly, these habitats tend to encompass a wide range of values, such as: 
290 biodiversity, nature conservation, aesthetic, recreation and tourism values. 
291 [Figure 5 here]
292 [Table 3 here]
293 The discount rates observed by country are presented in Table 4. Average discount rates ranged between 0% 
294 and 3.8%, with an overall mean value of 0.6% across all countries. Overall, the majority of countries displayed 
295 average discount rates below 1%, with the exception of Germany, Poland and Spain, with rates of 1.4%, 3.8% 
296 and 1.7%, respectively. Maximum rates of 10.9% and 11% were found for sites in Spain and the UK, but with 
297 mean values of 0.7% and 1.7%, respectively, these were considered to be outliers. Indeed, the next highest 
298 discount rate was significantly lower, estimated at 6.8% in the case of Polandv. The high variation in development 
299 land prices for sites in Poland, ranging from €340,000 to €1,020,000 (Appendix I) can explain the difference of 
300 4% found between the minimum and maximum discount rates for this country.  Similarly, for the UK and Spain, 
301 the large variation in discount rates can be attributed to the large differences in natural land (Table 1) and 
302 development land values (Appendix I) for these countries.
303 [Table 4 here]
304 Across development sites, estimated discount rates ranged between 0.4% and 1.2%, with general development 
305 representing the highest rates on average, followed by industrial (0.9%), office (0.5%), residential (0.4%) and 
306 commercial (0.4%) land uses (Table 5)vi.
307 [Table 5 here]
308 There has been much debate among economists as to whether the demand for environmental protection is 
309 disproportionately distributed across income groups. Indeed, conservation policies may be seen as regressive 
310 based on the notion that net benefits will be larger for individuals with high incomes than for those with lower 
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311 incomes (Boardman et al., 2017). This is evidenced prominently in the case of contingent valuation studies, 
312 where a strong correlation is found between income and environmental protection. In such cases, individuals 
313 are often asked to value environmental resources based on conditions such as the welfare they derive from and 
314 their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for conservation programs. Consequently, a valid assumption would be that 
315 individual responses would depend largely on personal factors, such as the amount of disposable income 
316 available to them, and the proportion of which they are willing to allocate to environmental causes, as well as 
317 how much they value the environment relative to other non-environmental goods and services. For dealing with 
318 distributional issues across socio-economic groups, Pearce (2003) argues that both the income elasticity of 
319 demand and the income elasticity of WTP are useful measures for measuring the effect of income on levels of 
320 environmental protection and in classifying environmental goods. Where the former refers to the change in the 
321 quantity demanded of some environmental asset in response to a small change in income, the latter deals with 
322 the change in WTP for some environmental asset with changes in income.  However, since the focus of most 
323 environmental policy is on public goods that have some quantity constraint, Pearce argues  that the income 
324 elasticity of WTP is the more relevant measure of the relationship between income and the environment (Flores 
325 and Carson, 1997). 
326 Since a large extent of the studies evaluated employed CVM studies to measure the value of natural land, and 
327 given the strong empirical relationship between income and environmental quality within CVM, a sensitivity 
328 analysis was conducted to test the relationship between various elasticities and the impact they might have on 
329 the EP and subsequent discount rates (see Appendix IV). 
330 3.2. Hypothetical illustration of the EP in Spain
331 To show how the EP would work in practice, we present an illustrative case study where we imagine a 
332 development project is undergoing an investment appraisal. Using the data derived for Spain as an example, let 
333 us assume that a residential development project has been proposed for a natural site that has been estimated 
334 to generate annual environmental benefits (or a TEV) of €22,309 per hectare. Given that the development will 
335 likely eradicate most (if not all) of the natural benefits of the land, we can use this figure as a proxy for the 
336 environmental (social) cost of development. Now let us imagine that for the same plot of land the developers 
337 foresee a positive net economic impact of €40,000 annually. The local authorities must now make a decision 
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338 over whether the development goes ahead or not. In order to make their decision, they wish to consider the net 
339 impacts of the project over the next 40 years. This requires comparing the social cost of building on the land 
340 with the expected stream of economic benefits generated by the project. By simply comparing the project’s 
341 costs and benefits, we can examine the impact that different discount rates would have on the final outcome of 
342 the decision. While the economic benefits are discounted using a market-based rate of 6%b, we consider three 
343 scenarios for discounting the social cost of the project: the first uses the same market-based rate of 6%, the 
344 second applies a rate of 4% as suggested by Gollier (2008), and the last uses the discount rate determined by 
345 the EPc (Table 6).
346 [Table 6 here]
347 The results of the hypothetical cost-benefit analysis presented in Table 6 show us that the investment project 
348 would generate a positive net impact over 40 years of €177,993 and €283,880 when applying discount rates of 
349 4% and 6%, respectively. However, when using the 1.39% discount rate derived from the EP, the project is shown 
350 to result in a negative net-present value of -€61,467. Thus, the project would only be justified under the first 
351 two scenarios. This demonstrates how the discount rates applied in traditional cost-benefit analyses can be 
352 largely biased (Chiabai et al., 2013), while a more sustainable approach would be to use site-specific discount 
353 rates (such as those from the EP) to ensure that affected environmental assets are being properly accounted 
354 for. The reason being that, ceteris paribus, in countries where the environment is highly valued rates could be 
355 higher than in those where the environment is valued less, and in countries where market prices of development 
356 land are high, we can expect to find lower discount rates than in countries where the market price for 
357 development land is low. 
358
359 4. Discussion
b This estimate is in line with the ADB, which reports a social discount range of 4-6% for various sectors in Spain (Zhuang et al., 
2007)
c This is estimated using the conventional formula for the EP, calculated based on a natural land value of €22,308.67 and a 
development land price of €1,605,229 situated in Valencia, Spain
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360 The application of the EP could represent an interesting instrument to re-establish the equivalency between the 
361 economic importance of two types of land (natural land and natural land designated for development) 
362 accounting for all attributes. In practical terms, this means that the discount rate derived from the EP can favour 
363 the protection of natural land in investment projects concerning development choices over the territory.  This 
364 is because current assessment methods are unable to properly account for the total value of natural assets and 
365 environmental resources, particularly those that have no close monetary substitutes (Dietz et al., 2016). As a 
366 result, management regimes rarely consider the aggregate measures of human welfare, such as cultural or 
367 psychological values and the irreversible loss of nature, which are of at least equal, if not growing importance 
368 (Adger et al., 2011). The EP therefore reinforces the idea that discount rates should differ geographically on the 
369 basis of local specificities, including the preferences of society on development, environmental policies and 
370 environmental resources. That is, in countries where great value is already given to natural land or 
371 environmental resources there is less of a need to adjust discount rates to guarantee their protection. In 
372 contrast, in areas where little value is given to natural resources, the EP can be used as an additional policy 
373 instrument to ensure protection by using lower discount rates during project appraisal.  
374 Our results show that factors such as the type of habitat, geographical location and the type of land-use 
375 development can play a role in shaping discount rates derived by the EP. In the case of the latter, for example, 
376 discount rates were estimated to be lower for residential land use (0%) when compared to industrial land use 
377 (1%) across study sites (Table 5). This shows that the magnitude of the discount rate depends on both the TEV 
378 and the market price for development land. As mentioned previously, this implies that the higher the price of 
379 development land, the greater the need to use discounting to generate the right incentives to protect natural 
380 land. And equivalently, the lower the value attached to the natural environment, the greater the need to ensure 
381 its protection through appropriate discount rates. Certainly, with average discount rates below 1% for most 
382 countries (Table 4), the main findings indicate a support for policy decision-making that sustains the protection 
383 of natural lands and ecosystems. By essentially equating the long-term value of protection and the cost of 
384 development on natural lands through locally specific discount rates, the EP provides an alternative means of 
385 assessing the financial viability of projects and programmes that could detrimentally impact conservation efforts 
386 and sustainable landuse practices. 
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387 Taking the case of climate adaptation for example, the EP can be an important determinant for deciding between 
388 adaptation options that may have fundamentally different impacts on the use of natural resources. This is an 
389 important consideration since decisions taken on adaptation today may have negative environmental and social 
390 implications for future generations, and since the value of future generations is often only considered in todays 
391 decisions through formal discounting methods in economics (Adger et al., 2009). This raises concerns as to how 
392 we can reconcile the non-market and non-instrumental aspects of the environment with the economic metrics 
393 employed in climate change decision-making, as well as how to deal with the risk of irreversible loss. Indeed, 
394 while economic losses are easily accounted for in conventional decision-making frameworks on climate change, 
395 ecological, cultural and psychological losses are often, if not always, underemphasized (Adger et al., 2011). This 
396 is demonstrated within this analysis by the high frequency of discount rates estimated to range between 0% and 
397 1%, suggesting that natural sites are commonly being undervalued (Appendix III). Policy development must 
398 therefore recognise that successful adaptation is not limited to the efficiency of economics or engineering, but 
399 depends equally, if not more, on the wider societal and environmental benefits of measures. Subsequently, as 
400 Adger et al. (2011, p. 20) note: “there is a need for more geographically and culturally nuanced risk appraisals 
401 that allow policy-makers to recognise the diverse array of climate risks to places and cultures as well as to 
402 countries and economies.”  
403 Certainly, application of the EP and the analysis presented here maintains both benefits and limitations. Of 
404 noteworthy, one important ancillary benefit of applying the EP relates to the uncertainty of expressing TEV as a 
405 unit per hectare. While the use of common units of measurment is crucial in economic valuation for comparative 
406 purposes, uncertainty lies in calculating a flow value by simply dividing the total value of an entire site by its 
407 area. Indeed, much of this is related to identified cognitive biases such as scope insensitivity in CVM (Kahneman, 
408 2000). As a result, values per hectare may be lower for larger sites, and higher for smaller sites, while the total 
409 TEV may be similar in magnitude. In some cases this may lead to unrealistic values of natural land, as the true 
410 value per hectare may not be appropriately reflected. This phenomenon has been widely recognised in welfare 
411 economics, where the overall size of a natural site may affect is value per unit area, in accordance with the 
412 concept of decreasing marginal utility. The notion is supported by several meta-analyses of ecosystem and non-
413 market valuation. Ghermandi et al. (2010) in their extensive valuation of natural and man-made wetlands, for 
414 example, find a negative relationship between wetland abundance and wetland value. The authors attribute this 
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415 to a substitution effect, whereby people’s perceptions and preferences of one site are affected by the presence 
416 of alternative sites that may substitute some of the social and environmental services provided by that 
417 environment. Similarly, in their study on biodiversity values in forest ecosystems, Ojea et al. (2010) find that the 
418 provision of additional forest hectares results in a significant marginal decreasing utility, where a 1% increase in 
419 forest area leads to a 0.59% decrease in forest marginal value. The hypothesis is also supported by Schild et al. 
420 (2018), in their meta-analysis on the monetary valuation of dryland ecosystem services the authors find that the 
421 larger the selected study extent, the lower the resulting estimated ecosystem service.
422
423 The application of the EP may offer a solution to these problems, since the value per hectare of these ecosystems 
424 may be lower than might otherwise be expected from an ecological perspective, the associated discount rate 
425 will also be smaller, allowing for a re-balance in the value of the natural site compared with its development 
426 counterpart. This can be justified from a biological and ecological standpoint also, since rigorous economic 
427 assessment would require us to adress issues related to non-linearity, threshold effects, spatial variability and 
428 irreversible damages (Bagstad et al., 2014). 
429 The main limitation of this study relates instead to the availability of market data on development lands. While 
430 for most cases data on adjacent development lands within similar district or provincial jurisdictions was 
431 available, for some countries market prices for development land were found only for specific urban areas or 
432 capital cities. This can be problematic since the EP should ideally be applied using land values with similar   
433 environmental characteristics and within the same local jurisdiction. Moreover, land prices from capital cities 
434 will probably be among the highest within each country, which will subsequently lead to lower discount rates 
435 than we might otherwise expect.  For example, in the case of Sweden, TEV values of €4-20/ha/year (Table 1) 
436 were obtained from an assessment of ecosystem services in the County of Vasterbotten, while prices for 
437 residential and industrial land were representative of Stockholm. As a result of the generally low TEV values of 
438 the natural sites and the high market prices for development land in the capital, discount rates for Sweden were 
439 estimated at 0.0% on average (Table 4).  
440 Nevertheless, the discount rates presented here are not intended to be prescriptive. Instead, the purpose of this 
441 study is to show how the EP might apply in different societal and contextual settings. Accounting for the strong 
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442 heterogeneity of the data related to land-use, scale and representativeness of sites for each country would help 
443 consolidate results to some degree, however undertaking a serious comparison among countries would rely on 
444 more robust site-specific information on the market prices of land designated for development, social 
445 preferences about natural sites, as well as decision-making affecting territorial planning. Indeed, these factors 
446 have strong geographical implications that will vary among and within each country, and will mean that discount 
447 rates can be expected to differ considerably according to each site. The key contribution of this work is therefore 
448 to show that the EP can be employed in completely different contexts, moving towards the definition of different 
449 “Equivalency Principles”.  
450 5. Conclusion
451 With discount rates ranging between 0% and 11%, and averaging 1% across countries, the EP has been 
452 demonstrated as an alternative policy tool for incentivising the protection of natural lands within territorial 
453 planning and decision-making. In line with our aforementioned hypothesis, the EP results in discount rates that 
454 are geographically differentiated and that vary according to habitat and social preferences over natural and 
455 development land types. Consequently, the EP offers a new way of guaranteeing sustainable land-use in the 
456 long-term, taking into account the many dimensions of sustainable development, including: economics, society, 
457 institutions and the environment. Moreover, the EP can provide an important, and often unconsidered, 
458 dimension to decision-making particularly in the case of climate change where the threat of catastrophic impacts 
459 and environmental degradation may cause irreversible damages in the future. Subsequently, the EP may be used 
460 within policy development, particularly in land and urban planning decision-making contexts, for addressing 
461 increasing scarcity of natural resources, by balancing economic and environmental objectives, and capturing a 
462 more considered value of natural resources and their intrinsic worth to both current and future generations. 
463 The EP is particularly relevant for adaptation decision-making, which has been largely structured by economic 
464 objectives set forth by institutions and political processes without recognising the wider cultural and context-
465 specific ramifications of policy choices. Further research in this area would benefit from a more in-depth insight 
466 into social preferences over natural sites as well as locally-specific factors affecting sustainable land-use 




469 Acknowledgements: This research is supported by the Basque Government through the BERC 2018-2021 
470 program and by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness MINECO through María de Maeztu 
471 excellence accreditation MDM-2017-0714. Additionally, it is also supported by the European Union’s Seventh 
472 Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no. 
473 603906 (ECONADAPT Project) and the Horizon 2020 RESIN Project (EC-H2020, grant agreement no. 653522). E. 




















492 Appendix I 
493 Description of market prices for general development, residential, industrial, office and commercial lands 
Country
Price of Development 
Land (EUR, 2016)
Type Source(s)




Finland 320,000 – 1,675,000
Residential, Industrial, 
Commercial
(National Land Survey of 
Finland, 2016)
Germany 1,135,084 General Development (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015)
Greece 1,160,503 – 26,111,326
Commercial, Industrial & 
Residential
(NAI, 2011)
Italy 99,907 – 1,651,263 Commercial & Industrial
Average of advertised plots for 










(Central Statistical Office, 2016)
Spain 894,112 – 2,366,317
General Development & 
Industrial
(Ministerio de Fomento, 2014)
Sweden 4,257,956 Residential (NAI, 2011)
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Turkey 3,142,829 Industrial (Colliers International, 2016)
UK 991,991 -4,668,192 Residential & Industrial (Valuation Office Agency, 2011)
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516 Based on a comprehensive literature search, estimates for the income elasticity of WTP were often found to be 
517 less than unity, and commonly ranged between 0.3 and 0.7 (Pearce, 2003). However this range is challenged by 
518 McFadden & Leonard (1993) and McFadden (1994), based on their assertion that an income elasticity of WTP 
519 that is less than unity does not accord with economic intuition, based on the plausibility that preservation would 
520 be a “luxury” good that for poor households is replaced by needs for food and shelter. Based on these 
521 arguments, elasticities of 0.3, 0.7, 1.0 and 1.2 were chosen to test how discount rates change as the income 
522 elasticity of WTP changes. On the grounds that an elasticity of 0.3 will mean that a 1% change in income will 
523 result in a 0.3% change in WTP, and conversely, that an elasticity of 1.2 will mean that the same 1% change in 
524 income will result in a 1.2% change in WTP, and so on and so forth. These results are included in the online 
525 supplemental material. In general, the EP was found to be insensitive to changes in elasticity. That is, for a 1% 
526 change in the value of the elasticity the discount rates vary between a minimum of 0.06% to a maximum of 
527 0.43%. More closely, it is possible to see that for countries such as Finland and the UK, the higher the income 
528 elasticity of WTP the higher the discount rate resulting from the EP will be. That is, the more sensible the WTP 
529 to changes in income, the less you need to use the discount rate to adjust the values of the two plots (i.e. the 
530 higher the recommended discount rate is). However, in countries such as Spain and Greece this most frequently 
531 works in the opposite direction. This may suggest that demand for natural and well preserved land in richer 
532 countries is considered a normal good (i.e. income elasticity of demand being positive) while in countries with 
533 lower GDP that have been recently suffering a severe economic crisis may be seen as an inferior good (i.e. 
534 income elasticity of demand being negative). Answering this question is however well beyond the scope of this 
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783 Figure 1: Two pieces of natural land (N1, N2) of equal properties selected to illustrate the 
784 application of the EP
785 Figure 2: Conditions of socially optimal decision-making on land-use allocation
786 Figure 3: Number of discount rates estimated for each country
787 Figure 4: Distribution of habitat types by country
788 Figure 5: Box plot showing discount rates by habitat type 
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(Desmyttere and Dries, 2002; Moons, 2002; 
ten Brink et al., 2011)











9  – 36,514
(Birol et al., 2006; Ghermandi et al., 2010; 




3,000 - 5,500 2 – 5,750








(Hein, 2011; Kuik et al., 2006; ten Brink et 
al., 2011)
Poland Forest 32,764 23,290 (Považan et al., 2014)





6 – 258,527 (del Saz-Salazar and Rausell-Köster, 2008; 
Galarraga et al., 2004; Hoyos et al., 2007; 





Forests Boreal, coniferous, deciduous, forested swamps, woodland
Wetlands Floodplains, rivers, lakes, lagoons, marshes, mud flats, swamps
Grassland Farmland, meadows
Coastal Shoreline, coastline, dunes
Mountain areas Basins, cols, inland hills, valleys
Habitats
Green urban areas Parks, green land, greenbelt
Provisioning Freshwater provision, timber, wood fuel, agriculture, forestry, fisheries
Regulating Erosion and flood control, carbon sequestration, water purification and regulation, wind protection
Cultural Services Recreation, tourism, cultural and historical heritage, eco-tourism, education
Ecosystem services









National Parks, Nature Reserves, Sites of Special Scientific Interest, 
Sites of Community importance, Ramsar and UNESCO sites, 
Environmentally Sensitive Areas.Status of land
Unprotected Urban parks, green land, agricultural land
del Saz-Salazar, 2012; ten Brink et al., 2011)
Sweden Forest 3,717,407 4 -20 (Bostedt and Mattsson, 2006)
Turkey Wetlands 14,750 387 (Gürlük, 2010)
UK
Wetlands, grassland, 
water body, coastal, 
woodland, mountain, 
forest
67 -179,284 9 – 94,860
(Bateman et al., 2000; Bishop, 1992; 
Cobbing and Slee, 1994; Everard, 2009; 
Hanley and Spash, 1993; Klein and Bateman, 
1998; Luisetti et al., 2011; Maxwell, 1994; 
ten Brink et al., 2011; Turner et al., 2004; 
Willis, 1996, 1990; Willis and Garrod, 1993) 




Table 2: Description of habitats, ecosystem services, valuation methods and status’ of natural lands
792
Coastal Forest Grassland Water Body Wetland
Median 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2
Mean 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.6
Max 10.9 6.8 1.8 1.4 11.0
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
No. Of Entries 41 137 30 15 129
Table 3: Estimated discount rates by habitat type (%)
793
Country No. Of 
Entries
Median Mean Max Min
Belgium 4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1
Finland 44 0.5 0.9 4.5 0.0
Germany 2 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.1
Greece 48 0.1 0.4 3.1 0.0
Italy 21 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
Netherlands 64 0.1 0.2 1.3 0.0
Poland 4 3.0 3.8 6.8 2.3
Spain 26 0.1 1.7 10.9 (8.5)* 0.0
Sweden 4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Turkey 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
UK 90 0.3 0.7 11.0 (3.7)* 0.0
Total 352 0.2** 0.6** 11.0** 0.0**
*() values in parenthesis indicate next highest value
** represents the average value across all cases








A. Benefits of the project B. Environmental costs
Discount rate 
applied to project 
benefits (%)
Present value of 
project benefits
Discount rate applied 
to environmental 
costs (%)







4% 463,859.13 177,992.746% 641,851.87
1.39% 703,318.67 -61,466.80
Table 6: Cost-benefit analysis example of a hypothetical investment project in Spain using a time horizon of 









Median 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1
Mean 1.2 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.4
Max 10.9 2.9 11.0 4.1 4.5
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
No. Of Entries 42 47 88 27 104




i Chiabai et al. (2013, p. 540) define administrative unit as “the public administration having the responsibility 
for land use planning and for granting building permits in a specified area”.
ii All observations come from Europe except one from Turkey, but for simplicity we will refer to all countries as 
European
iii Database on OECD PPP and CPI factors can be found at: http://stats.oecd.org
iv See Appendix II for box plot of discount ranges by habitat type including outliers
v As represented in Figure 4, the value of 6.8% is also considered to be an outlier, and may be an overestimation 
of the maximum discount rate for this country. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Highlights:
 The Equivalency Principle tends to result in lower discount rates than market rates
 Rates based on the EP were estimated for 11 European countries 
 Results support the premise of geographically differentiated discount rates
 Results show rates ranging from 0% and 11% across all European countries
 An average discount rate of 1% across study sites was estimated
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